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I.

Introduction

“Life is risky” is one of those casual conversation lines that is too general to be
meaningful. People, in fact, often have little appreciation for the magnitude of
important risks, such as financial market risk, even when they know that investing
in certain products – say, stocks – is fraught with a lot of uncertainty about the
possible gains and losses. It is one thing to know that risk exists, but quite another
thing to know what precisely risk can do to and for your investments.
People generally don’t like risk, but they tolerate it. They often try to protect
themselves from economic risk as much as possible. They buy insurance, where
possible, but insurance is not available when it comes to investing. Instead, they try
to weigh the financial rewards against the risks of investing in specific products,
such as stocks or bonds.
This implies that individual investors know what they are getting into. Many
investment decisions, though, are often based on an incomplete understanding of
the risk that an investment carries with it. Knowing that GM stocks are risky is not
all that meaningful if people don’t know how this risk compares to that of bonds
issued by Orange County, CA. And, individual investors do not fully understand the
risks involved in particular investments because the information is either not
relevant, too complex, inaccessible, or a combination of these characteristics. A lot of
people invested in AIG, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, or
WashingtonMutual during the heydays of the mortgage boom, just to learn about
undisclosed risks the hard way –by losing much of their hard earned money.
Many people, on the other hand, may be spooked by the ups and downs of financial
investments and avoid them all together, leaving “money on the table.” They may
not reap potential financial rewards that come with accepting some risk or, if they
don’t invest at all, they may forego available tax breaks. A large share of Americans –
typically more than one‐third – do not save enough and need every help that they
can get to build up enough wealth for retirement. This includes accepting some risk
exposure in exchange for potentially higher rewards. Some risk exposure is hence
often unavoidable to meet savings goals, but too much risk can be detrimental to
one’s financial health.
It is likely that people can achieve better investment outcomes – more savings and
fewer headaches – if they have better information about risk. Financial service firms
already disclose risk in very general terms, but information is either too scarce or
buried too deeply in legal disclosures to be useful to consumers. Policymakers and
regulators are consequently starting to look at better ways to keep individual
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investors informed about risk. Better information on risk – more relevant, more
concise, and more accessible—could help individual investors make better informed
choices and become better savers.
Regulators should thus study the best ways to present information on risk. This
paper discusses three numerical and three visual presentations of investment risk
that span the range of risk presentation in ways that could be relevant, concise, and
accessible to individual investors. The discussion also highlights which depictions
are more likely to improve risk disclosure to individual investors. The discussion
shows that there is still a fair amount of uncertainty on how best to present risk.
Additional research on the accessibility of a number of risk presentation methods
will thus have to be part and parcel of the policy development process in the future.
II. The need for more and better risk disclosure

Retirement savings can also be thought of as future income. Economic risk means
that the exact level of future income is unpredictable since there is potential for
investment gains and losses. A bull market will generate, all else equal, much higher
retirement savings and thus, much higher future income than a bear market. And, a
well performing specific investment, e.g. a company’s stock, will generate much
higher retirement savings than a poorly performing investment. But nobody knows
beforehand which investments will do well and which ones won’t. This
unpredictability of the future performance of investments is what is known as
investment risk.
Investment risk is an economically unavoidable cost. It is true that people tolerate
risk, but they don’t love it: they mostly view it as an economic cost, not an economic
benefit. Where possible, individuals even try to seek out insurance to protect
themselves from risk. But, there is no insurance to guarantee performance for most
investments. Instead, investors will seek higher investment returns for riskier
investments. Economists and financial advisors know more risk should go along
with the potential for greater rewards – the risk‐return tradeoff. Stocks are riskier
than bonds, for instance, but investors also hope to earn higher rates of return on
stocks than with bonds.
It is generally not enough for investors to know that one investment is riskier than
another. They need more specific information to tailor their investment strategy to
their future income needs. Individual investors need to know how high the chance
of a substantial gain or loss is to make an informed decision that fits their
investment needs.
The right information on investment risk can go a long way in improving retirement
savings and financial decisions. There are significant costs to having too much or too
little risk exposure with one’s investment choices. Too much risk could mean
outsized losses when things go wrong, e.g. markets crash. The cost of too little risk,
on the other hand, is that an individual investor may forego rewards associated with
risky investment. Individual investors may then save too little, requiring more years

3

of work or lower retirement living standards. An increase in the rate of return by
one percentage point, say from 5% to 6%, which will carry more risk with it, will
increase future income by more than one third over a 30‐year career.
Many Americans will need all the help that they can get to build more savings to
maintain their standard of living in retirement. More than 40% of Americans did not
have enough money saved to generate enough income to maintain their standard of
living in 2004 or 2007 and more than 50% of Americans did not have enough
money saved for a secure retirement in in 2009.1 Accepting a little more risk may be
one way for some households to increase their future income. Striking the right
balance of risk is not easy, however. Individual investors indeed seem to incur too
little or too much risk. One of the enduring puzzles in economics, for instance, is
why many individuals have no investments in stocks2 and instead put most of their
money in their homes or in cash3. At least some stock investments probably make
sense for most investors. Yet, typically more than half of all American households
have no investments in the stock market, either directly through a broker or
indirectly through mutual funds or retirement savings accounts. But then again,
many investors who invest in stocks follow a “buy and hold” strategy, i.e. they do not
rebalance their portfolio to get out of stocks when stock prices increase and they do
not buy more stocks after prices decline.4 Individual investors may thus oscillate
between too much or too little risk. Too much risk occurs after stock prices have
increased for some time and too little risk may occur after stock prices have been
low for some time.
It is possible then, that better risk disclosure could result in better investment
outcomes. Individuals are prone to regularly making mistakes in complex decisions,
such as investment decisions. For one, complex decisions involve complicated
information. This information is often not presented in a way that facilitates
decision making. Crucial details are hidden in fine print. There is also no standard
set of details that is provided for all investments by all banks, which could facilitate
comparison shopping between investments and between banks. And, there is often
no feedback of information to the investors on their past decisions, which could
enable investors to learn from their past mistakes. Information that is easily
1

Munnell, A., Webb., A. & Golub-Sass, F., 2009, The National Retirement Risk Index: After the Crash,
CRR Issue Brief No. 9-22, Boston, MA: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College.
2
There are other risky assets, such as derivatives, but stocks are more wide spread and more easily
purchased. Economists hence use stocks as the archetypical risky investment. If we cannot explain why and
how individuals invest in stocks, we probably cannot explain why and how they invest in pork belly
futures.
3
This is known as the equity premium puzzle. It has been widely studied in modern economics, but can
trace its roots back to Mehra, R. & Prescott, E., 1985, The Equity Premium: A Puzzle, Journal of Monetary
Economics 15: 145‐161. See also Bernartzi, R. & Thaler, R., 1995, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity
Premium Puzzle, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 1: 73‐92 and Kocherlakota, N.R., 1996, The
Equity Premium: It’s Still a Puzzle, Journal of Economic Literature 34(1): 42‐71.
4
Mitchell, O., Mottola, G.R. & Utkus, S., 2005, The Inattentive Participant: Portfolio Trading Behavior in
401(k) Behavior, Pension Research Council Working Paper 2006-5, Philadelphia, PA: Pension Research
Council, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.

4

understood by investors and that offers feedback could ultimately result in better
investment decisions.
III. Numerical and visual options for better risk disclosure

Risk is the uncertainty of future outcomes. An investment may gain money, but it
may also lose money, depending on how the money is invested. The gains and losses
may also be relatively small or comparatively large, depending again on the
investment. A gain or loss of 10% in a year with a money market mutual fund is a lot
less likely than with a mutual fund invested in emerging market stocks.
Investment companies should hence be required to disclose relevant, concise, and
accessible information on the risk of particular investments to their clients.
First, the information needs to be relevant. Individuals perceive risk as a game of
chance. There is the probability of winning and losing. Any risk measure that seeks
to inform investors of the risk associated with a particular investment will have to
reflect this uncertainty of future outcomes.
Second, the information should be concise. The risk information, for instance, should
not be a lengthy table that lists all past annual rates of return for a particular
investment and the probability that each rate of return occurred during the past
decade or century. Such a “data dump” would only serve to confuse consumers and
would not lead to more informed decision making, even though it provides relevant
information.
Third, the information needs to be accessible. A concept such as standard error,
which refers to how widely dispersed rates of return on a particular investment
have been in the past, may be a common depiction of risk, but it is not something
that many investors will find intuitively understandable. The information, although
relevant and concise, is inaccessible and thus does not reach all of the intended
target audience.
All information for complex decision making needs to provide individuals with an
opportunity to receive feedback. How well would their investments have done if
they had chosen a different investment, for instance? All ways to describe risk that I
discuss in this section offer the possibility for feedback, as I discuss at the end of this
section.
The discussion here presents six ways of describing risk. Three examples are
numerical descriptions and three are visual presentations of risk. They all have a
few things in common:
First, they show risk as potential variations of investment outcomes. They all show
the possibility of gains and losses associated with a particular investment. All six
measures thus provide relevant information.
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Second, all measures are concise. They condense a lot of information – decades’
worth of financial rates of return into a few numbers or a single figure.
Third, as I discuss below, all measures are accessible since they use common
reference points for individual investors. They speak to investors’ common
understanding of risk, but do so with a fair amount of precision. Investors will thus
not have to learn new terms, but they will gain additional insights.
All risk measures rely on the past performance of an investment. Consider the
information we have from the past performance of an investment. There is a
minimum rate of return – smallest increase or largest decline – a maximum rate of
return, the average rate of return, the variation of the annual rate of return over the
years, and the probability of a particular outcome during the past years.
Risk in numbers
We can use these data to show risk numerically in three different ways – as depicted
in Table 1. The first risk disclosure (MaximumMinimum) shows the full range of
possible outcomes by showing the range from the lowest possible to the highest
possible past rate of return. The second example (Typical Range) shows how widely
the annual rate of return typically swings by presenting the range in which 95% of
all past rates of return have fallen. The third example (Benchmark) shows the
likelihood of losing or gaining a fixed percentage of an investment, here of 10% of
the investment, in any given year.5 The table shows how the complete information
of an investment could look with the disclosure of the average rate of return, fees,
and risk for an investment, such as a mutual fund invested in stocks or Treasury
bonds.
These three measures already meet two of our three criteria. They are relevant and
concise. They depict uncertainty of outcomes and hence reflect people’s general
understanding of risk. All three measures are also concise, describing risk with two
figures.
This leaves us with accessibility. All three measures are accessible – investors will
intuitively know what they mean. Consider the data in Table 1. All three risk
calculations show that stocks vary much more widely than bonds. The historical
maximum for stocks, for instance, is more than four times larger than that for bonds,
the relative variation in stocks is almost three times as large as that of bonds, and
the potential of a 10% gain is almost seven times larger for stocks than for bonds.
The bad news, though, is that stock investors have substantial chances of losing
money, while this is not the case if one holds a Treasury bond to maturity. The
information in Table 1 hence reflects what people already know – stocks are riskier
than bonds. These measures are thus relatively accessible to individual investors
since they rely to some degree on common understandings of what investment risk
looks like. They just offer more precision on the magnitude of risk in specific
5

The calculations raise a few technical issues, which are addressed in the Technical Appendix.
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investments, which allows individual investors to compare investment options with
each other.
Table 1
Examples of numerical depictions of risk as part of complete investment
information
Name of
investment
Maximum
Minimum
S&P 500
Long‐term
Treasury bonds
Typical Range
(95% of cases)
S&P 500
Long‐term
Treasury bonds
Benchmark
(Probabilities of
10% loss vs. 10%
gain)
S&P 500
Long‐term
Treasury bonds

Average rate of
return

Total fees

Net rate of
return (minus
fees)

Risk

12.4%
6.1%

0.5%
0.3%

11.9%
5.8%

‐39.5%/62.7%
2.0%/15.1%

12.4%
6.1%

0.5%
0.3%

11.9%
5.8%

‐18.3%/43.1%
0.6%/11.6%

12.4%
6.1%

0.5%
0.3%

11.9%
5.8%

7.6%/56.2%
0.0%/8.3%

Notes: Rate of return and risk figures are author’s calculations based on actual S&P 500 and Treasury
bond data from 1946 to 2007. They reflect data on the gross total return, the sum of capital
appreciation and dividends, excluding fees. Fees are only shown for illustrative purposes and do not
reflect any actual data for particular mutual funds. See the Technical Appendix for additional
information.

Picking a winning number
Which measure is the best then? All three measures have their own advantages and
disadvantages. The MaximumMinimum range, for instance, shows the largest
possible variation since it presents the historical end points of uncertain outcomes.
It has the advantage of showing investors everything that could possibly happen,
but it has the disadvantage of presenting only the extremes, which have a very low
probability of actually occurring.
The Typical Range of 95% of all cases shows a more realistic band of possibilities. It
ignores the rare occurrences of the top and bottom 2.5% of potential outcomes. It
has the problem, though, that it makes it seem that all possible outcomes within the
95% range were equally likely of occurring, which is not the case. There is no
distinction between outcomes that have a much higher probability of occurring and
those that have a much lower probability of occurring within that Typical Range.
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The Benchmark – probability of a 10% loss or gain – addresses the main concern
with the first two measures – their lack of precision of what happens within the
range of all possible or typical outcomes. Some outcomes in those ranges will be
more likely than others. The probability associated with a specific gain or loss
provides the missing piece of information. This measure raises the concern, though,
of which benchmark to choose. A 10% stock market gain, for instance, is a rather
frequent occurrence as the numbers show, while it is unlikely, but still possible for
Treasury bonds. A 10% loss, though, is a meaningless comparison between stocks
and bonds since any loss is impossible for Treasury bonds in this example. A lower
loss number, e.g. of 5%, would still show a figure of zero percent for Treasuries, but
would be too large to be meaningful for stocks – such losses can happen frequently
in a given year. There is no objective way of identifying a Benchmark that is
meaningful for all investments.
The Typical Range measure is theoretically the most attractive measure. It is
concise, yet meaningful. It gives investors a sense of where a typical outcome will
fall. In combination with the average rate of return, investors can thus gauge how
widely around the average annual rates of return are typically dispersed. The
investor won’t mistakenly hope for an extreme maximum rate of return to occur
during her lifetime or fear that an extreme minimum will happen while she is saving
for retirement, but rather, she will make her investment decisions on what are more
regular recurring events. At the same time, the investor won’t rely on a performance
comparison between investment options that is based on an arbitrarily chosen
benchmark.
The last question is then whether the Typical Range measure is as accessible as the
other two measures. The Typical range measure uses a widely employed tool called
“anchoring.” It anchors investors’ expectations by telling them where almost all
possible rates of return in the past have fallen. The investor is essentially being told
what a reasonable expectation for future rates of return are and what are
unreasonable expectations. The measure creates its own accessibility. Other insights
on human psychology suggest that the Typical Range measure is thus at least as
accessible as the MaximumMinimum measure. Individuals tend to have difficulties
discerning the meaning of extremes. A phenomenon called “loss aversion” leads
humans to overestimate the probability of extreme positive events (gains) and
underestimate the chance of extreme losses.6 A measure based on extreme rates of
returns – maximum gain and minimum loss – could consequently serve to confuse
investors’ decisions, such that they will invest too much or too little in particular
investments.
The comparison between the Typical Range and the Benchmark with respect to
accessibility is a little less clear. The Benchmark also uses anchoring, but it
essentially tells the investor that the chosen benchmark is the most relevant one. It

Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A., 1979, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk,
Econometrica 47: 263‐291.
6
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is akin to non‐profits soliciting donations and putting specific dollar amounts, say
multiples of $25 starting with $25, into their solicitation letter. Research finds that
people often donate at least the minimum or choose one of the pre‐designed
options, rather than fill in their own preferred number, e.g. $37. There is no reason
to believe, though, from an economic perspective that multiples of $25 are the only
choices that donors want to make. The non‐profit essentially steers people towards
its own desired outcome, a minimum amount of $25 and multiples of $25.7 Similarly,
the Benchmark would give tremendous power to those who decide which
benchmark to use. The measure may be accessible, but it has the potential to
influence people’s decision making in unintended ways. Investors may infer from
Table 1, for instance, that they need to seek out investments that generate gains of
at least 10% per year and that avoid losses of 10% or more. The Benchmark
measure may thus steer investors’ behavior, rather than inform their behavior.
Risk in pictures
The discussion of the three risk measures shows that there is one measure that is
likely preferable to others. This results from the fact that the information needs to
be concise. Numerical depictions will consequently have to make some choices on
which numbers to use out of many daily, weekly, or monthly numbers for
investments. This necessary selection will inevitably create possibilities to influence
investors’ decisions, rather than just informing them.
Alternatively, we can show risk visually. A visual depiction can show many more
data points and thus provide investors with more information than is the case with
numerical depictions. The trade‐off for using visual depictions instead of numerical
depictions may be that the information may become less concise and possibly less
accessible. There is, after all, more information shown that may make the
presentation more complex.
Table 2 shows the three visual risk depiction options. They somewhat mirror the
numerical depictions. The first one shows the Full Range of past outcomes with a
line that connects the maximum rate of return to the minimum rate of return and
puts a marker at the average rate of return. This line shows the full range of gains
and losses for investing in stocks and Treasuries for one year.
The second picture shows a Bell Curve of the past outcomes with lines demarking
the typical range of where 95% of past rates of return fell. The Bell Curve is a
standard depiction of the distribution of possible outcomes, e.g. rates of return in a
given year. A larger distance between the curve and the horizontal line of the graph
means that an outcome is more likely to happen, while a smaller distance – lower
point on the Bell Curve – indicates that a point is less likely to happen. The Bell Curve
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See Sunstein, C. & Thaler, D., 2008, Nudge, Revised and Expanded Edition, New York, NY: Penguin
Books for more details and discussion on the psychology of anchoring and its economic implications.

9

shows the likelihood of all potential gains and losses from investing in stocks and
Treasuries for one year.
The third picture shows Fan Graphs. Each line in the Fan Graphs is associated with a
particular probability. It shows the cumulative rates of return that have at most a
10%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 90% chance of occurring. The bottom line, for instance,
shows the cumulative annual rates of return that an investment will exceed in 90%
of all cases after one year, five years, 10 years, and 15 years of investing in stocks
and Treasuries. The top line, in comparison shows the cumulative rates of return
that an investment will only exceed in 10% of all cases. The color of the lines
gradually fades as the probability of the total gains or total losses moves away from
the middle (median) to illustrate the dispersion of gains and losses.8 The Fan Graphs
picture consequently provides more information than the other two graphs, as I
discuss below.9

8
9

Varying the thickness of the lines may be an alternative visual aid to graphically accentuate dispersion.
There are alternative possibilities of using Fan Graphs, which are shown in the Technical Appendix.
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Table 2
Examples of visual depictions of risk as part of complete investment
information
Name of
investment
Full Range
S&P 500

Average
rate of
return

Total
fees

Net rate
of return
(minus
fees)

12.4%

0.5%

11.9%

Risk

Rate of return

60.0%
40.0%
20.0%
0.0%
-20.0%

6.1%

0.3%

5.8%
60.0%

Rate of return

Long‐term
Treasury
bonds

40.0%
20.0%
0.0%

S&P 500

12.4%

0.5%

11.9%

11

Avg

-20.0%
-40.0%

Bell Curve

Ma

M

Long‐term
Treasury
bonds

Fan Graphs
S&P 500

Long‐term
Treasury
bonds

6.1%

0.3%

5.8%

12.4%

0.5%

11.9%

6.1%

0.3%

5.8%

Notes: Rate of return and risk figures are author’s calculations based on actual S&P 500 and Treasury
bond data from 1946 to 2007. They reflect data on the gross total return, the sum of capital
appreciation and dividends, excluding fees. Fees are only shown for illustrative purposes and do not
reflect any actual data for particular mutual funds. See the Technical Appendix for additional
information.

What the pictures tell us
The three visual depictions show again a greater dispersion of gains and losses for
stocks than for Treasuries. This is in line with what we would expect. The graphs
thus provide relevant information by quantifying the uncertainty of investing in
particular investments in a way that should fit people’s general preconceived
notions. The information speaks to individual investors’ experiences.
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The primary advantage of the visual display is that it offers the possibility of
presenting more information than with numerical representations. Consider the
example of the Full Range line since it offers the least amount of information out of
the three visual displays.10 It shows the end points – the minimum and maximum
rates of return – for stocks and bonds. It also shows the average rate of return. And,
it shows if the potential outcomes are more spread out above or below the average.
An individual investor would thus be able to gauge whether the maximum or
minimum rate of return is further away from the average – and thus potentially
infer how much more likely it is to get close to the maximum than to the minimum,
or the other way around. The Full Range, for instance for Treasuries, shows that the
maximum is a lot further away from the average than the minimum, which could
imply that the maximum (or rates of return close to the maximum) are harder to
reach than rates of return close to the minimum. This is a lot more information than
just knowing the two end points of the line, as Table 1 shows with the Maximum
Minimum.
The Bell Curve offers even more information than the Full Range. It shows not only
the range of possible gains and losses, but it also offers a measure of the likelihood
of those gains and losses. A higher point on the curve, for instance, suggests a
greater likelihood of that particular investment outcome than a lower point. The
likelihood of an outcome is marked on the vertical axis. A gain of 20% with stocks in
a given year is thus much more likely than a gain of 40%, although both gains fall
into the Typical Range of 95% of potential gains and losses shown in Table 1. The
additional information contained in the Bell Curve thus offers a qualification of the
numerical depiction of the Typical Range.
The Fan Graphs contain the most information. The vertical comparisons between
the lines of the Fan Graphs show the dispersion of total cumulative gains and
cumulative losses after investing for one year, five years, 10 years, and 15 years of
investing in stocks or Treasuries. This comparison shows that gains and losses of
stocks are more widely dispersed than gains and losses of Treasuries. A horizontal
comparison shows how the dispersion of gains and losses changes with holding
stocks or Treasuries for longer periods of time. The visual displays are generally as
concise as the numerical displays. There is one picture with one line for both the
Full Range and the Bell Curve. The Fan Graphs use five lines each in the example in
Table 2, but can do with as little as two lines. These are thus rather brief depictions
of a lot of data.
The visual displays, however, may be less accessible than the numerical depictions.
The inclusion of additional information makes it harder for those providing the
information, financial firms, to steer individual investors’ decisions, but this may
come at a cost. Each visual depiction may require some additional explanation of

10

The Full Line should ideally run horizontally, not vertically to facilitate the comparison between
investment options. The line is shown vertically here only because of graphic limitations of the software
used.
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what the graph shows. We cannot assume that individual investors will be familiar
with Bell Curves, Fan Graphs, or Full Range lines. A visual display will thus require a
legend that explains its meaning. This adds to the information that financial service
providers have to show individual investors and thus may make the information
more complex. More research needs to be done to determine how much complexity
will still allow individual investors to make optimal financial decisions.
There is no clear way to determine which visual depiction is preferable to the
others, unlike the case for numerical depictions. There are, however, two reasons
that may suggest that the Full Range depiction is preferable to the Bell Curve or Fan
Graphs. The Full Range offers more possibilities to use common, easily
understandable visual aids that could potentially make risk more comprehensible
with the Full Range than with the Bell Curve and the Fan Graphs. Consider the
following example:

whereby the ruler would run again from minimum to maximum and the
arrow would point to the average rate of return. Instead of an arrow, one could, for
instance, also use a pendulum to illustrate the swinging motion – uncertainty – of
financial rates of return:

The possibility for such insertion of more visual aids exists only with the Full Range
line since Bell Curves and Fan Graphs contain more and more complex information
that does not easily lend itself to additional visual aids without making the depiction
more complex.
Another consideration is that the Full Range presentation may allow for more
precise comparisons than the Bell Curve or Fan Graphs. It is presumably easier for
individuals to compare the lengths of different lines, rather than how skewed, wide,
and high a Bell Curve is or how dispersed Fan Graphs are. A Bell Curve for one stock,
for instance, may look fairly similar to that of another stock, particularly when the
visual depiction is relatively small, as in Table 2. It is unclear, though, if the
possibility of using more visual aids and greater precision in the comparison of
visual depictions is enough to make one visual depiction preferable to the others,
which include more data.
We are thus left with four possible risk depictions. One numerical depiction –
Typical Range – that is superior to the other two numerical descriptions and three
14

visual options. Regulators will have to further investigate how much information
individual investors can digest without making the information dissemination
inaccessible to the average individual investor.
The need for feedback
The literature on the psychology of complex decision making indicates that
individuals can improve their decisions if there is room for feedback on their
decisions. They need to be able to learn from their mistakes in short order, before it
is too late. It is not necessarily helpful to investors to learn, after retirement, that
their investment strategy for the past three or four decades should have been
different. The feedback needs to happen regularly and close to the original decision,
so that investors can take corrective measures, e.g. take fewer or more financial
risks.
Financial service firms can provide feedback on risk and decisions involving risk, for
instance, by showing the risk for the entire market, either stocks or bonds, or the
average risk for the type of mutual fund that an individual investor is considering.11
This comparison can be presented at the top of a page or web site, so that investors
can easily compare the risk information for their investments with the benchmark
information. Additional feedback comes in the form of regular financial statements
that allows individual investors to compare how their investments performed over
relevant time periods relative to other investments with similar characteristics.
IV. Key stakeholders already think about risk disclosure

There is a need to inform individual investors about the risk associated with their
investment choices. Many investors take on too much or too little risk in their
investments. The discussion in the previous section shows that there are options to
show information on investment risk that is relevant, concise, and accessible and
that offers the possibility for feedback. This discussion could advance the discussion
on how to improve individual investment decisions. The relevant stakeholders –
financial service firms, policymakers, and researchers – already consider ways to
better inform investors. And individuals already show a remarkable ability to
process a range of data points, when the information is relevant, concise, and
accessible. The discussion of the previous section may consequently contribute to
an ongoing, important policy debate.
Financial service firms already consider risk in matching investments and investors
Financial service providers already try to match individual investors’ risk
preferences with their investment choices. Banks need to make sure that the
investments that they offer to their clients are suitable to their clients needs and

11

Tables 1 and 2 only show risk for the entire stock market and for the typical bond portfolio for bonds
with specific maturity, so that this additional information is not included there.
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abilities. An investor who shies away from risk should not be sold an investment
that has a substantial chance of losing (and gaining) a lot of money.
Security brokers, for instance, have to apply a “suitability” standard in their
investment recommendations. They have to consider an investor’s risk tolerance,
among other items, when they recommend an investment.12
Mutual funds similarly consider the risk tolerance of their investors in making
investment recommendations. They often ask their clients to classify their attitude
towards risk. Are investors, for instance, looking for a conservative, balanced, or
aggressive investment strategy, whereby conservative includes the least risk
exposure and aggressive includes the most risk exposure? Financial service
providers then match individual investors with specific recommendations based on
the investors’ answer.
This approach of letting financial service providers match risk tolerance with
investment recommendations poses a threefold challenge. First, the risk
classifications tend to be rather crude – giving investors approximately three to five
choices to self classify their risk tolerance. What about somebody who self‐
identifies, for instance, as a conservative investor, but who has leanings towards a
balanced portfolio? There is no middle ground in these classifications. Second,
investors will classify risk tolerance differently. One investor may self‐identify as
conservative, while another may self‐identify as a balanced investor, yet both would
be happiest with a balanced portfolio. The correlation between self‐identified risk
tolerance and the amount of financial risk that people actually tolerate can vary
widely and is biased towards underestimating one’s own actual risk tolerance.13
Financial service providers relying on subjective risk assessments may thus guide
individual investors to investments that are overly conservative. Third, the
approach of matching risk preferences and investment recommendations
deliberately takes away some choice from the investor. Financial service providers
are required to steer the choices of investors towards the most suitable
investments. But, individual investors often do not have the necessary tools to
explore alternatives, if they so desire.
The approach of requiring relevant, concise, and accessible disclosure of investment
risks of all investment options is a supplement to having financial service providers
match investors’ risk preferences and investment recommendations. First, offering
risk information relies on objective criteria, rather than subjective self‐
identification. Both are valid and necessary tools to ensure that investors make
optimal choices, but the objective information has been largely absent. Second, the
12

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010, Suitability, Washington, DC: SEC. accessed on
October 26, 2010. http://www.sec.gov/answers/suitability.htm
13
Hallahan, T.A., Faff, R.W. & M.D. Mckenzie, 2004, An empirical investigation of personal financial risk
tolerance, Financial Services Review, 13: 57‐78; Snelbecker, G.E., Roszkowski, M.J. & N. E. Cutler, 1990,
Investors’ risk tolerance and return aspirations and financial advisors' interpretations: A conceptual model
and exploratory data, Journal of Behavioral Economics, 19(4): 337‐393.
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investor can use the information to fine tune the match of her investments to her
risk preferences based on the additional information. A financial service provider,
for instance, may recommend a range of options based on risk classification and an
individual investor may then decide to choose from a menu of investment options
based on the objective information on average rates of returns, fees, and risk. Third,
individual investors can use the information to comparison shop between
investment options and financial service providers. An individual investor may
decide to compare her investments to alternatives offered either by the same
financial service provider or by a competitor to ensure that her investments
optimally meet her needs.
Policymakers already consider means to improve risk disclosure
Some lawmakers have already started to consider improving risk disclosure to
provide information and better choices to individual investors. A number of
members of Congress proposed to include legislative language to improve fee
disclosure on retirement investments in H.R. 4213 (Unemployment Compensation
Extension Act of 2010).14 The provisions would have required that retirement plan
sponsors, typically employers and financial service firms, inform individual
investors about the fees and the level of risk, among other items, associated with
specific investments. The proposed legislation did not specify how risk should be
disclosed. That level of specificity is typically left to the proper regulatory body, in
this case the Department of Labor’s Employment Benefit Security Administration.
The discussion of this paper thus contributes to a legislative desire to help investors
make better informed investment choices.
Economists already study ways to improve disclosure of information
Regulators and legislators have taken note of the risk exposure of individual
investors and the need to improve risk information. Economic research has, in
recent years, generated a fair amount of evidence on the type of information that is
useful to improve individual decision making, particularly when it comes to complex
markets, such as financial markets.
The burgeoning field of behavioral economics has integrated insights from
psychology into economics.15 The basic insight that is relevant for this discussion is
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Kittredge, B. M., 2010, 401(k) Fee Disclosure and Pension Funding Provisions of H.R. 4213, Chairman
George Miller (D-CA), Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington,
DC., May 21, accessed October 26, 2010 http://edlabor.house.gov/blog/2010/05/401k-fee-disclosure-andpensio.shtml.
15 DellaVigna, S., 2009, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, Journal of Economic
Literature 47(2): 315‐372 offers a detailed summary of the academic literature in this field with a
particular emphasis on the insights of behavioral economics for retirement savings. Sunstein, C. &
Thaler, D., 2008, Nudge, Revised and Expanded Edition, New York, NY: Penguin Books provide a
popularized discussion of the insights of behavioral economics and their implications for public
policy design. Bernheim, D. & Rangel, A., 2005, Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and Policy
Analysis with Non‐Standard Decision Makers, NBER Working Paper No. 11518, Cambridge, MA:
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that individuals are prone to making costly errors when making complex decisions.
Individuals who save with 401(k) type plans hold too much cash or do not diversify
their assets optimally, incurring too much or too little risk. 16 Individual investors,
for example, often tend to invest large shares of savings in their employer’s stock,
which exposes them to large risks in their current and future incomes if their
employers encounter financial difficulties. Enron’s employees would have been
much better off if their 401(k) plans had not been invested as heavily in employer
stock.17 Individual investors also only infrequently rebalance their portfolios, i.e.
they hold more and more stocks as stock prices rise and fewer and fewer stocks as
stock prices fall.18 This describes a “buy high, sell low” investment strategy that can
make a serious dent in one’s retirement savings.
These systematic errors are related to psychological characteristics of individuals.
One key lesson is that individuals can be systematically misled in judging complex
information. Public policy will thus have to establish processes that provide
guidance to individuals in processing complex information.19 This can happen by
making information more accessible than it currently is. Accessibility arises from
presenting complex information in a concise fashion so that individual investors can
easily compare prices (or risk in this case) between different products and firms.
Information also needs to relate to people’s experience. And, it needs to allow for
feedback, so that individuals can learn from their mistakes in time to correct them.20
Individuals already process complex information on a regular basis

National Bureau of Economic Analysis, discuss how behavioral economics relates to traditional
neoclassical models and the normative implications of behavioral economics. And, Benartzi, S. &
Thaler, R., 2007, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 21(3):81‐104 provide an insightful discussion of systematic biases in retirement
savings.
16 Benartzi, S. & Thaler, R., 2007, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior, Journal of
Economic Perspectives 21(3):81‐104; Huberman, G. & Jiang, W., 2006, Offering versus Choice in
401(K) Plans: Equity Exposure and Number of Funds, Journal of Finance 61(2): 763 – 801. Iyengar, S.
& Kamenica, E., 2006, Choice Overload and Simplicity Seeking, Working paper, Columbia University.
17 Benartzi, S. & Thaler, R., 2007, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior, Journal of
Economic Perspectives 21(3):81‐104; Holden, S., VanDerhei, J., Alonso, L. & Copeland, C., 2008,
401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan Activity in 2007, Research Perspective,
14(3), Washington: Investment Company Institute. Fidelity Investments, 2009, Fidelity Reports on
2008 Trends in 401(k) Plans, Boston.
18 Mitchell, O., Mottola, G.R. & Utkus, S., 2005, The Inattentive Participant: Portfolio Trading Behavior
in 401(k) Behavior, Pension Research Council Working Paper 2006‐5, Philadelphia, PA: Pension
Research Council, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Reid, B. & Holden, S., 2008,
Retirement Saving in Wake of Financial Market Volatility, Washington: Investment Company
Institute.
19
See Sunstein, C. & Thaler, D., 2008, Nudge, Revised and Expanded Edition, New York, NY: Penguin
Books for their proposal, for instance, to develop better disclosure tools or what they call “Record,
Evaluate, and Compare Alternative Prices (RECAP)”.
20
See Sunstein, C. & Thaler, D., 2008, Nudge, Revised and Expanded Edition, New York, NY: Penguin
Books for a discussion of the relevant psychological insights and lessons for the presentation of complex
information.
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Accessibility of risk information is one of the criteria laid out here for the selection
of a risk disclosure method. This raises the larger question of whether the inclusion
of risk information per se will overwhelm investors and hence make financial
information inaccessible. After all, investors already receive information on the
average rate of return of an investment in the past, typically for the past year. They
also receive information on the fees charged on an investment. Adding risk
information to this mix may overwhelm individual investors with too much
information.
Individuals, though, can handle a fair amount of data if it is presented concisely,
which the forms of risk disclosure discussed above do. Consider Table 3 as an
example.21 It shows the pitching and hitting statistics for Stephen Strasburg of the
Washington Nationals for the 2010 MLB season. There are a total of 26 statistics
displayed for just one year for just one player. Sports fans can digest multiples of
this level of data to figure out, for instance, whether Stephen Strasburg’s injury and
operation in late summer of 2010 may hurt their team in the following season.
Moreover, the table shows that the typical sports fan is well aware of averages and
ratios, often as a result of relatively complex calculations. An example is the ERA –
earned runs average. This is the number of runs that did not occur as a result of
errors or passed balls multiplied by nine and divided by the innings that a player
pitched. The ERA tells us how good a pitcher is at shutting out the other team. A low
ERA, such as Strasburg’s 2.91, indicates, for instance, a successful pitcher.
Baseball statistics also include measures of uncertainty. The ERA is again a good
example. It shows the risk (or opportunity) for the opposing team to score a run
against a particular pitcher by providing the (scaled) chance that a pitcher will let
the other team score a run. It thus allows sports fans to easily compare players’
pitching strength with each other. It seems reasonable to assume that individual
investors will be able to understand the meaning of two numbers defining
investment risk if the typical sports fan can interpret the ERA for a pitcher.
Table 3
Pitching and Hitting Statistics, Stephen Strasburg, 2010 MLB Regular Season
Pitching Statistics
Year
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Credit goes to Edward D. Tufte, who with his presentations and books on the visual presentations of data,
convincingly argues that individuals can process more quantitative information than scientists often give
them credit for, when the information is properly presented. He regularly uses the example of sports
statistics to show that individuals can easily process multitudes of complex information. Tufte, E.D., 2001,
The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 2nd Edition, Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press.
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V. Conclusion

This paper discusses the need for better information on investment risks. The
information should be relevant, concise, and accessible to individual investors. More
and better information on factors that are likely to influence an investment’s
performance and investors’ decisions should eventually lead to better investment
decisions – more savings and higher retirement incomes.
This paper presents a number of ways to disclose risk to individual investors. There
are three numerical and three visual representations to risk. The discussion centers
on the pros and cons of each risk representation. All risk descriptions show relevant
information, are concise, and more or less accessible.
There is a clear tradeoff between numerical and visual displays of risk. Visual
displays generally contain more information than numerical displays, but the added
information may make them less accessible.
There is no clear winner that emerges from this discussion, although one numerical
representation is likely to be better than the other two. It is not possible, though, to
equally order the visual presentation from better to worse. Policymakers will thus
have to sponsor more research on which risk depictions is best suited to the needs
of individual investors.
There is a possibility that even the best information on risk will result in regular
mistakes by investors. Even the best informed investors may take on too much or
too little risk in their investments. Better education for investors may be one way to
address this concern. The presentation of risk information should thus give the
possibility of feedback. Investors need to be able to regularly learn from their
mistakes or find affirmation of their past decisions. Banks, for instance, should
inform investors how risky alternative investments have been, while investors held
their investments, e.g. by showing the risk for the entire market or for the average
for similar investment products such as mutual funds invested in stocks or bonds.
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Technical Appendix
The risk presentations in the body of this paper raise a few technical issues that are
addressed in this Technical Appendix.
Data
The examples in the paper use historical, weekly data for the S&P 500 and for long‐
term Treasury bonds, specifically the interest rate on 20‐year Treasury bonds.
The examples first use the data to calculate the average rate of return and the
standard deviation of the rate of return for each asset – stocks or Treasury bonds.
The total rate of return on stocks is the sum of capital appreciation and dividend
yield. The capital appreciation for stocks is calculated as year‐over‐year changes.
The average dividend yield during the preceding year is added to arrive at the total
rate of return for stocks. The total rate of return for bonds is the average interest
rate for a bond with that maturity over the course of one year.
The reality of average rates of return looks different. Typically disclosures will
present the average rate of return for the past year, for the past five years, and for
the past ten years. When an investment is younger than, say, five years, the
information is not provided and the investor will know that the investment is a
rather novel product.
It will be a critical policy decision to set the rules for the risk presentation, so that it
matches the typical average rate of return calculation. This will include a decision
over which period financial risk should be measured. Should risk be calculated for
the past year, for the past five years, and for the past ten years? The risk information
should ideally match the rate of return information, as it does in the body of the
paper, but there may ultimately be too much information to be useful. It may thus
make sense to only provide the risk information for the past decade to give
investors relatively comprehensive data on risk. The calculation should be
conducted for the longest time period possible, if data for a whole decade are not
available. Another question is whether the risk calculation should be based on daily,
weekly, or monthly data. Daily data will offer a more reliable and more realistic
calculation since it provides the most data points and since investors will, in fact,
buy or sell their investments at any given day.
Probability calculations
The probabilities of losses and gains and the range of “typical” outcomes are derived
by assuming a normal distribution. Financial market returns can often follow a log
normal distribution. If this is the case, the probabilities of gains in this paper are
underestimated and the probabilities of losses are overstated. The illustrative
differences between stocks and bonds in the paper are unaffected by the assumed
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distribution of the returns. Stock returns will still be higher and their fluctuations
larger than those of bonds.
Alternative Fan Graphs
The Fan Graphs in the text show the dispersion of total gains and total losses if an
individual investor invests in stocks and Treasuries for one year, five years, 10
years, or 15 years. The alternative depiction of Fan Graphs in Table A‐1 shows the
average rate of return of investing in stocks or Treasuries for given time periods.
The depiction shows similar information as the Fan Graphs in Table 2. Those Fan
Graphs showed the cumulative effect of investing for one year, five years, 10 years,
or 15 years. The Fan Graphs in Table A‐1 show the average rate of return during the
same time periods, based on the same data. The cumulative rates of return in Table
2 show a wide dispersion of outcomes for stocks over time, while the average rates
of return in Table A‐1 show a narrowing of the average rates of return over time.22
The average rates of return on stocks, though, are still much more dispersed than
those of Treasuries, even after investing in stocks for 15 years, for example. The
calculation of the average rate of return may be misleading since individual
investors will presumably care more how their total investments will grow over
time than how the average rate of return may change over time.
The alternative Fan Graphs are shown here only for completeness sake. They show
what Fan Graphs would look like if they were comparable to the other visual
depictions of risk in Table 2, i.e. the risk of investing in stocks and bonds for one
year.

22

This simply reflects the fact that stocks go back (revert) to their mean over the medium term. That is,
periods of large gains are followed with some regularity by periods of lower gains or even losses and
periods of losses are followed by periods of smaller losses or even gains. The same is not necessarily true
for bonds, which is also reflected in the Fan Graphs for Treasuries, which essentially shows no narrowing
between the lines. Large gains and large losses, relatively speaking are thus as likely if an investor holds
Treasuries for just one year or for 15 years.
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Table A1
Alternative example of Fan Graph depictions
Name of
investment

Average
rate of
return

Total
fees

S&P 500

12.4%

0.5%

Net
rate of
return
(minus
fees)
11.9%

Long‐term
Treasury
bonds

6.1%

0.3%

5.8%

Risk

Notes: Rate of return and risk figures are author’s calculations based on actual S&P 500 and Treasury
bond data from 1946 to 2007. They reflect data on the gross total return, the sum of capital
appreciation and dividends, excluding fees. Fees are only shown for illustrative purposes and do not
reflect any actual data for particular mutual funds. See the Technical Appendix for additional
information.
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